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POWER OF CALIFORNIA'S DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE
TO REGULATE PRODUCE HANDLERS
In California there are approximately 12,000 individuals and firms
which purchase "farm products" from producers for preparation and
sale to retail outlets.1 These processors, dealers, and other handlers
pay farmers over $3
billion annually. 2 Every handler of "farm
products" must be licensed by the California Director of Agriculture.3
This note will examine in the light of two recent cases the Director's
power to regulate California's produce handlers under licensing and
disciplinary provisions of the Agricultural Code.

The Director's Licensing Power
Whether any person or firm is a handler requiring a license depends on whether or not that person or firm engages in any business
transaction involving "farm products. ' 4 This phrase is to be broadly
construed. 5 Since it is a misdemeanor for a handler to act without
a license, 6 the unlicensed handler operates at his peril. It is within
1 The number has remained at about this level for the last 20 years.
There were 12,120 such licensed handlers as of December 31, 1966; the number
was 12,632 in 1955, and 11,451 in 1945. PartialReport of the Joint Legislative
Comm. on Agricultural and Livestock Problems, pt. 1, at 24, in 1957 APPENDIx
TO THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE.

CAL. AGRIC.

CODE

§§ 55402, 55407, 56102-07 define the categories of han-

dlers that must be licensed; sections 55403, 56109 define "farm products,"
generally providing that all classes of plant products except timber and all
classes of animal products except milk are included, for purposes of the two
relevant code chapters, chapters 6 and 7 of division 20.
2 CAL. STAT. ABSTRACT at x (1966).
These figures, in the group "Miscellaneous," include the receipts from timber sales, not covered by the Agricultural Code chapters considered here. Total cash farm receipts in California
equalled $3.709 billion in 1964, and $3.751 billion in 1965 (leading the nation).
Id.
3 CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 55481, 55521, 56181.

Beyond its immediate effect on the licensees, the regulation by the Director directly affects those who raise the crops on California's nearly 100,000
farms and those who are employed by partnership and corporate handlers.
By 1961 one-eighth of California's manufacturing workforce was engaged
in processing and manufacture of food and kindred products. CAL. STAT.
ABSTRACT 4 (1962). "Value added" to the economy by all manufacturing
totaled $18.3 billion in 1964, including $2.5 billion by food product industries,
the second largest industry group in terms of value added. CAL. STAT.
ABSTRACT at x (1966).
4 See note 1 supra for the code definition of "farm products."
5 See, e.g., 7 Ops. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 349 (1946) (turkey eggs are farm
products); 7 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 298 (1946)

(wild fur-bearing animals may

be "livestock," and therefore farm products); 10 Ops. CAL. A9T'y GEN. 77
(1947) (barnyard fertilizer is included); 44 Ops. CAL. A'r'Y GEN. 70 (1964)
(broker needs license if in sale of ranch and cattle the cattle are sold to ond
other than the buyer of the ranch).
6 CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 55902, 56181.
[4941
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the discretion of the Director to deny an applicant a license for having once operated without a license 7
Issuance or renewal of a license may be denied unless the applicant's "character, responsibility, and good faith"'8 are demonstrated
to the Director.9 Partnership and corporate applicants must convince
the Director of the character, responsibility, and good faith of all persons holding management positions with the organization or owning
a substantial interest in it. 10
The Director may suspend or revoke a license for any code violation.'
Such disciplinary action is the greatest administrative
threat to the handler. 12 Examples of recent court review of Director
adjudications demonstrate the application of the license suspension
power.

The Power of the Director to Suspend a License
In Almaden-Santa Clara Vineyards v. Paul,1 3 a processor of
farm products sought review of the suspension of its license by the
Director. 4 The processor, Almaden, had paid a producer of grapes
7 CAL. AaRic. CODE §§ 55488(a), 55528(a), 56191(a); see, e.g., Camp v.
Brock, 75 Cal. App. 2d 169, 170 P.2d 702 (1946).
Besides subjecting themselves to penalties under the code, unlicensed
operators cannot enforce contracts in the courts. See, e.g., Capitelli v.
Sawamura, 123 Cal. App. 2d 169, 266 P.2d 939 (1954); La Rosa v. Glaze, 18

Cal. App. 2d 354, 63 P.2d 1181 (1937); cf. Brock v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 10
Cal. 2d 512, 75 P.2d 605 (1938). The possibility of entering into an unenforceable contract should prompt the producer to determine whether the
buyer of his products is licensed.
8 CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 55485, 55525, 56186; Mosesian v. Parker, 44 Cal.
App. 2d 544, 112 P.2d 705 (1941).
9 CAL. AGRIc. CODE §§ 55485, 55525, 56186.
l0 CAL. AGRIc. CODE §§ 55486, 55526, 56187. See generally Partial Report

of the Joint Legislative Comm. on Agricultural and Livestock Problems, pt. 1,
at 9, in 1957 APPENDIX

TO THE JOURNAL or Tau

SENATE.

Through bonding requirements the licensing process elicits a concurrent
screening, carried out by surety companies. See CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 55551-59,
56221-30.
11 The provisions outlining procedure for such disciplinary action are
set out in CAT. AGRIc. CODE §§ 55841-51, 56531-43.
12 Normally hearings and adjudications follow formal complaints filed
with the Director by farmers. The California Bureau of Market Enforcement
(Division of Compliance, Department of Agriculture) is responsible for the
administrative enforcement, through delegation from the Director, of the
handier-regulating provisions in the Agricultural Code. CALIFORNIA FARm
AND RANcH LAW § 7.25 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1967). Producers may file
complaints with one of the five regional offices of the Bureau. Id. at § 7.33.
If approached, the County Agricultural Commissioner will assist the producer
in filing the complaint with the Bureau. Id. at § 7.33. Upon receiving a com-

plaint, the Bureau of Market Enforcement first investigates the transaction in
question and attempts to secure a settlement satisfactory to grower and handler. CAL. AGRIc. CODE §§ 55745, 56443. The formal hearing process is initiated

only if it appears that the parties cannot reach a settlement. Id. Procedure for
the hearing is set out in the CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§ 55741-813, 56441-503.
18 239 Cal. App. 2d 860, 49 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1966).
14 Review was sought through administrative mandamus under CAL.
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$119,545. This figure was nearly $23,000 less than the price demanded
by the producer under an ambiguous contract clause calling for a
minimum price of $40 per ton "subject to provisions of federal marketing order on grapes."' 5 The Director interpreted the contract in
the grower's favor. After finding that Almaden had violated the
Agricultural Code by refusing or failing to pay for farm products,
the Director ordered Almaden's license suspended for the final 9 1/2
months of the 1-year licensing period. 6 The court held that the
Director may suspend a handler's license even though there is a bona
fide dispute over the 17contract price and the licensee has paid the
amount not in dispute.
Six year's earlier in Post v. Jacobsen,8 a case similar to Almaden,
the court reviewed disciplinary proceedings held pursuant to the chapter regulating dealers 9 and containing provisions essentially the
20 same
Post
as the handler-regulating provisions involved in Almaden.
had contracted to purchase a plum crop at a reduced price, agreed
upon because of certain hail damage and scale infestation. Stricken
from the printed form contract was the provision for passage of title
to the buyer upon delivery of the fruit to the packing house and
acceptance for purchase. Post had agreed to pick and haul the crop
at his own expense. When it was discovered that the scale damage
was more extensive than the parties had at first observed, Post
discontinued picking and refused to release the fruit on the trees.
The remainder of the crop became too ripe for use by either grower
or dealer. The Director found that the dealer had breached the contract,2 ' and on review the court affirmed the Director's license suspension order notwithstanding the fact that a bona fide dispute existed
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5. The court of appeal remanded the case to the trial
court, which, in not making findings on all material issues, had failed to
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence as required by § 1094.5.
239 Cal. App. 2d at 866-67, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
The suspension was ordered by the Director pursuant to provisions in
section 1300.4 of the Agricultural Code of 1933 (Cal. Stats. 1935, ch. 509, § 1,
at 1582). The 1933 Code was repealed in 1967 and the current Code enacted.
Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2. In the 1967 Code similar provisions are found
in sections 55841-51, with parallel provisions for other handlers in sections
56531-43.
15 239 Cal. App. 2d at 863, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60. The Federal Grapes
for Crushing Marketing Order, 26 Fed. Reg. 7797 (1961), set up a procedure
under which a seasonal maximum tonnage for grape crush might be set, with
a corresponding "setaside" provision for production beyond the desired maximum. No maximum crush was set in 1963, the season for which the contract
in Almaden was entered. 239 Cal. App. 2d at 863-64, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 260. It
was Almaden's contention that the $40 per ton minimum was to have applied
only if the tonnage available for crush had been limited that season pursuant
to the federal order. Id. at 863, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
16 239 Cal. App. 2d at 864-65, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61.
17 Id. at 871, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
1s 180 Cal. App. 2d 297, 4 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1960).
'9 CAL.AGRic. CODE §§ 1261-73, Cal. Stats. 1933, ch. 26, §§ 1261-73, at 274-87
(now CAL. AGRic. CODE §§ 56101-652).
20 Sections 1299.18 to 1300.5 of the Agricultural Code of 1933, Cal. Stats.
1935, ch. 509, § 1, at 1579-83 (now CAL. AGPuC. CODE §§ 55401-992).
21 180 Cal. App. 2d at 300, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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22

under the contract.
The Almaden and Post cases illustrate the role of the Director
in grower-handler disputes. The thrust of both cases is that the Director has the power to suspend or revoke a handler's license for the
willful failure to comply with contract terms even though there
exists a bona fide dispute over the performance required under the
contract. The following factors should be considered in determining
the justifiability of vesting in the Director this broad power: (1) the
legislative goals in setting up the handler regulation framework,
(2) the administrative procedural safeguards and the extent of judicial review available to the handler, and (3) the need today for administrative regulation of23 the relationship between producers and
handlers of farm products.
Justification of the Director's Power
Purpose of the Legislation
In California there have been many instances of unfair practices
by dishonest farm product handlers. 24 The 1927 Report of the Department of Agriculture suggests the sentiment prevailing in the
agricultural community between 1915 and 1927.25 Seeking protection
from dishonest handlers, California's farmers, through the agricultural press and farmers' organizations, called for legislation to license
and regulate produce dealers. 26 Numerous bills for regulating dealers
were introduced during the period, but no legislation was enacted.2 7
When a bill finally did pass both houses of the legislature in 1925, it
was not signed by the Governor.28 In 1927 the Produce Dealers
License Act was enacted with extensive support from the State
Grange, California Farm Bureau Federation, and Farmers Educational
Union-farmer organizations which anticipated that the legislation
would decrease the uncertainties in producer-handler transactions. 29
In the current code identical sections in the two chapters under
consideration expressly state that the marketing of agricultural products is "affected with a public interest."30 The code declares that
the provisions of the two chapters are enacted in the exercise of California's police power to protect the health, peace, safety, and general
welfare of the state.3 1 All economic groups involved-farmers, handlers, and consumers-benefit from the successful regulation of the
grower-handler relationship and the stimulation of a steady flow of
Id. at 303, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
The constitutional aspect is not considered here.
mliusTRAIvE LAw TREATiSE §§ 7.01-.20 (1958).
22
23

24 CA=oawiA FA

AND

RANcH LAW

See K.

DAVIs, AD-

§ 7.1 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1967).

See 1927 Report of the Dep't of Agriculture, Division of Markets 737,
in Vol. 4, 1929 APPENDIX TO THE JOuRNALS OF TH SENATE & AssENMLY.
25

26 Id. at 738.
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
CODE §§ 55431, 56131.
Id. The federal government has long recognized that the states have

30 CAL. AGRIc.
31

never surrendered such general police power. See Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
137, 147 (1902).
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farm goods to retailers. If handlers are required to make prompt
payment to farmers, the necessary money is available for growers to
prepare for the following season. The reputation of the handler
industry is improved and its bargaining power enhanced by the
screening processes which help to eliminate unscrupulous dealers
from the trade. 32 Handler regulation, by assisting the farmer carry
on his work, helps to insure the availability of farm products for the
consumer. Such goals of the police power clearly are advanced by
the legislation considered here. Still, within this framework, immediate concern is directed to the farmer.
The court in Almaden said that unless the Director can retain
jurisdiction of complaints whether or not a bona fide dispute exists,
the legislative scheme for protecting the farmer could be thwarted
whenever a handler merely disputed the claim of a producer. 33 Several cases besides Almaden have stated that the purpose of the two
handler-control chapters is to protect the farmer by helping him to
secure full payment for his farm products.3 4 The Almaden and Post
cases, in establishing the Director's broad jurisdiction over handlers,
help to advance this goal.
Procedural Administrative Safeguards and Judicial Review
Available to Handlers

Legislation provides several procedures by which a licensee may
avoid the possibility of license suspension or revocation. There are
two points 35
in the complaint-hearing process at which such avoidance
may occur.
When a complaint is filed with the Director by a producer, the first administrative act is an attempt to effect a settlement satisfactory to both parties. 30 At this point, handler and producer may settle their dispute under the informal supervision of an
impartial investigator from within the Bureau of Market Enforcement. It is only when no satisfactory settlement between
the two
parties can be reached that a formal hearing is necessary. 37
If a hearing is held and a handler's license is ordered suspended
or revoked, the licensee may still avoid the effects of the order. The
32 See generally PartialReport of the Joint Legislative Comm. on Agricultural and Livestock Problems, pt. 1, at 9, in 1957 APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL
OF THE SENATE.

33 239 Cal. App. 2d at 871, 49
34

Cal. Rptr. at 265.

See, e.g., People v. Mulholland, 16 Cal. 2d 62, 69, 104 P.2d 1045, 1048

(1941); Mosesian v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 2d 544, 551, 112 P.2d 705, 709 (1941);
4 Ops. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 344 (1944); cf. La Rosa v. Glaze, 18 Cal. App. 2d 354,
359, 63 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1936).
35 Outside the administrative framework any person may seek declaratory
relief respecting his rights under any contract by proceeding under CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 1060. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
The state's constitutional guarantee against imprisonment for debt, CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 15, was the basis for holding a provision making it a misdemeanor to fail to make settlement for produce purchased from a farmer unconstitutional. People v. Rohe, 114 Cal. App. 2d 605, 250 P.2d 647 (1953). It
has never been successfully argued that the constitutional prohibition restricts
the Director's power to revoke or suspend a license.
36 CAL. AGic. CODE §§ 55745, 56443.
37

Id.
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Agricultural Code provides that any such order may be made conditional upon the settlement or satisfactory adjustment of the consequences of any violation. 38 The Director's order suspending Almaden's license was expressly made subject to modification or vacation in the event of Almaden's settlement with the producer. 9 The
effective date of any order may be postponed to allow this further
attempt to settle.4 0 For example, in Almaden the Director modified
his order, which was to become effective 25 days after issuance, by
postponing the effective date41 30 days, and again for 15 days, at the
request of Almaden's counsel.
In addition, the Almaden case points out an alternative to proceeding to a hearing before the Director. 42 This alternative is available to the processor if it notifies the Director of intent to arbitrate
and faithfully observes the terms of an arbitration provision. 43 However, the availability of this procedure depends
44 upon the existence
of an arbitration provision in a written contract.
This arbitration alternative is the sole instance in which the
Agricultural Code provides that the Director's jurisdiction over a
complaint is actually suspended. 45 If, without reasonable cause, the
arbitrators "fail, refuse or neglect to adjudicate" the dispute within
90 days of the date of notification to the Director, his jurisdiction
may be restored. 46 Jurisdiction may also be restored in the event
that the processor fails to perform in accordance with the decision of
the arbitrators. 47 Despite these limitations, an arbitration provision
assures the processor of an alternative to the possibility of disciplinary
action on his license.
Although the court in Almaden pointed out that the Director
was not deprived of the power to suspend a license by the fact that
civil remedies were available, 48 the reasoning expressed in Charles L.
38 CAL. AGRIC.

CODE §§

55851, 56538.

39 Brief for Appellant at 2, 239 Cal. App. 2d 860, 49 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1966).
40 CAL. AGRIC. CODE

41

§§ 55851, 56538.

Brief for Respondent at 20-22, 239 Cal. App. 2d 860, 49 Cal. Rptr. 256

(1966).
The primary goal of the Director clearly is not to discipline code violators,
but rather to gain a settlement for the farmer on terms satisfactory to both
parties. There is a likelihood, of course, that in the face of a suspension order
the handler might agree to terms not truly satisfactory to him. But a suspension is ordered only after it has been determined that the handler did not
honor his contract, as interpreted after a formal hearing. See CAL. AGRIc.
CODE §§ 55741, 55841, 56531.
42 239 Cal. App. 2d at 871, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 265. See CAL. AGRIc. CODE §§
55742-44; 11 Ops. CAL. AT'Y GENr.222 (1948). There is no similar code provision in chapter 7 of division 20 covering all handlers other than processors.
43 CAL. AGRIc. CODE § 55742.
44 Id. In California it is a custom among farmers to rely on oral contracts,
but there is no indication that handlers are not successful when they request
a writing. See CALIFORNiA FAmv AwD RANCH LAw § 7.12 (Cal. Cont. Edue.
Bar ed. 1967).
45 CAL. AGRic. CODE § 55742.
46 CAL. AGRic. CODE § 55743.
47 CAL. AGRic. CODE § 55744.
48 239 Cal. App. 2d at 871, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 265. See also, People v. Terkanian, 27 Cal. App. 2d 460, 462, 81 P.2d 251, 253 (1938). CAL. AGRIC. CODE
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Harney, Inc. v. Contractor'sState License Board,49 involving a different state agency, puts a gloss on that proposition. In the Harney
case, the State Contractor's License Board adopted a regulation requiring licensed and qualified contractors to obtain separate specialty
licenses before entering into certain kinds of contracts. The licensee
sought a declaratory judgment 50 prior to the commencement of disciplinary proceedings, and the court stated that "[p]laintiff . .. is
not required to violate the administrative regulations and thereby
subject itself to possible criminal prosecution or disciplinary action in
order to obtain a declaration of its rights and duties."'51 It was implicitly recognized that any action by the agency should be held in
abeyance until the court's decision,52 and that the agency would be
bound by the declaration made by the court.53 It is likely that a court
would apply this rationale to a fact situation such as was involved
in Almaden, since the same reasons would exist. This approach
would avoid having the Director interpret a contract in a bona fide
dispute. This may well be the proper result since he is nowhere expressly granted the power to interpret contracts, 54 and has no special
aptitude for doing so.r5
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
appear to bar the action for declaratory relief, since the possibility of
irreparable injury and inadequacy of administrative relief are exceptions to the doctrine. 9 Certainly the anomalous result that might
follow if exhaustion were required-that the Director could find the
§ 55437 expressly provides that "[the rights, remedies, and penalties which
are provided for in this chapter are in addition to any other rights, remedies,
or penalties which are provided for by law ... ." There is no parallel provision in chapter 7, concerning dealers, but apparently additional legal remedies for breach by dealers have always been available to the producer. See
People v. Terkanian, supra; cf. People v. Murray, 87 Cal. App. 145, 150, 261
P. 740, 742 (1927).
In addition to the possible revocation or suspension of his license and
suit against him by the grower, the handler is subject to other, cumulative
penalties under the Agricultural Code. The Director may seek to recover a
$500 civil penalty from anyone who violates any handler regulation. CAL.
AGRic. CODE §§ 55922, 56652. The Director also has discretion to bring to the
attention of a district attorney the facts concerning any code violation which
may constitute a misdemeanor, with a $1000 fine or 1-year jail sentence, or
both. CAL. AOaic. CODE §§ 55901-06, 56631-39. Furthermore, he may sue to
enjoin a violation or threatened violation of any code provision in, or any order
made pursuant to, the two handler-regulating chapters. CAL. AGRIC. CODE §§
55921, 56651; see 11 Ops. CAL. ATV'Y GEN. 222 (1948).
49 39 Cal. 2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952).
50 Declaratory relief is available in California under section 1060 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
51 39 Cal. 2d at 563, 247 P.2d at 915.
52 39 Cal. 2d 561, 247 P.2d 913 (1952).
53 Id.
54 The Director's power to interpret contracts is implied from his power
to discipline the handler for nonpayment and nonperformance. CAL. AGaic.
CODE §§ 55872-73.
55 See World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1011
(1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 984 (1966).
56 See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Munro, 161 Cal. App. 2d 596, 605-07, 326 P.2d
929, 935-36 (1958).
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handler had breached and suspend its license, and in a later action
on the contract the court find there was in fact no such breach 57leads to the conclusion that this situation is within one or both of the
exceptions.
Judicial review of administrative orders through a writ of mandate is provided by section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All
questions of license issuance and renewal are reviewable under this
section, as are other questions arising out of complaints by farmers. 58
The handler is entitled to review of any such final administrative
decision or order.59 The court will inquire into the Director's jurisdiction, use of discretion and fairness of the hearing. 60 The Almaden
case indicates that the court is to use its independent judgment when
reviewing a license suspension order,6 ' and this includes making independent findings as to the rights and duties of the parties under
the disputed contract.6 2 Judicial review affords handlers a substantial protection by insuring the right to a fair administrative hearing. However, in the case of a bona fide dispute over a contract, a
processor would be well advised to seek declaratory relief before
reaching the Director rather than waiting for a review of the Director's orders on a writ of mandate. Use of the declaratory relief procedure would allow the handler to avoid the risk of a license suspension by the Director, and at the same time the handler would
have its rights under the contract determined by a court of law.
Need Today for Regulation of the Producer-Handler Relationship
The Bureau of Market Enforcement, in administering the regulatory powers given to the Director, serves the producer of farm products somewhat like a collection agency. Quick, inexpensive "service"
is available to any farmer who files a complaint against a handler.
But is the farmer today really in need of such an agency, or is the
57 Courts are not bound to accept the agency's interpretation of the contract. Cf. Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Commission, 28
Cal. 2d 33, 48, 168 P.2d 686, 695 (1946).
58 In Albert Albek, Inc. v. Brock, 75 Cal. App. 2d 173, 170 P.2d 508 (1946),
the court held that the Director could not deny without a hearing an application for an unlimited license after the legislature had called in all limited
licenses. Albek's license had been the subject of an investigation when it
was called in, and the Director had later determined that Albek had violated
the code. Id. at 174, 170 P.2d at 509.
Hearing is required under CAL. AGRiC. CODE §§ 55488(a), 55528(a), 55841,
56189, 56531.
59 Review is available under CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1094.5. See generally W. DEERING, CALIFORNIA ADMINIsTRATIVE ANDAImus (Cal. Cont. Educ.
Bar, 1966). Operation of the order may be postponed pending review. CAL.
CIV. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5 (f).
60 CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. § 1094.5(b). The inquiry into possible abuse of
discretion determines whether the Director's decision is supported by the
findings and whether the findings are supported by the evidence. CAL. CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 1094.5(b).
61 239 Cal. App. 2d at 866, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 262. The test of the evidence
to be applied depends upon the type of order reviewed. CAL. CODE Cirv. PROC.
§ 1094.5(c). See W. DEERING, CALIFORNIA ADMI1IsTRATVE MANDAMUs §§ 5.50.75 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar, 1966).
62 239 Cal. App. 2d at 867-68, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
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relationship one in which each party should fare for himself? Because economic strength differs among California's farmers, the answer
is not the same for every producer.
The present trend toward development of "agribusiness"--the
integration of the supply, production, and distribution functions of
the food product industry under central management 3 -improves the
position of some farmers in terms of increasing their bargaining
power, assuring their income, and correspondingly raising their
standard of living. The fact remains, however, that there are many
California farmers whose modest incomes and bargaining positions
make the Bureau of Market Enforcement a necessary and desirable
agency.64
Administrative adjudication relieves the burden upon courts.
Moreover, the agency's high degree of specialization makes it better
suited than a court to understand and deal with the relative bargaining power of producers and handlers. The efforts of the Director and
his staff, with personnel close to grower and handler problems also
insure the public of a steady flow of food products by encouraging
and protecting the grower.
The farmer's business prospects, while in several respects improving,65 are still generally affected by such factors as the general
climate, instances of weather extremes, damage or destruction by
insect and animal pests, and the perishability of crops. These
factors combine to minimize the bargaining power of many farmers
nearly every growing season.6 6 Because of the special nature of the
commodity he sells, the farmer is often faced with the prospect of
entering into an unfavorable contract.6 7 By helping the farmer with
63

See generally D. HARTMAN, CALIFORNIA AND MAw 220-53 (1964).

64 In 1962 California's 100,000 farms realized an average net income of
over $9,600. See D. HARTMAN, supra note 59, at 220. But that figure, the
arithmetic mean, is not in itself indicative of the wealth of many groups of
California farmers. The last U.S. Census of Agriculture in 1959 indicated
that 24 percent of all farms in the state were of less than 10 acres in size.
CAL. STAT. ABSTRACT 122-23 (1966).

An additional 35 percent of all farms

were in the 10 to 50 acre category; therefore, about 59 percent of all California farms were no more than 50 acres. Id. The median size is currently
about 40 acres. Id. It seems clear that the average net receipts figure is
greatly influenced by the nearly 20 percent of California farms which exceed
250 acres, including the 93,000-acre Irvine Ranch Company in Orange County.
Id.
65 In addition to the advantages accruing to farmers by the trend toward
agribusiness, farmers undoubtedly will continue to profit from improvements
in irrigation, pest control, fertilization, and plant and animal varieties. D.
HA TMAN, CALIFORN A AND MAN 222-32 (1964).
66 The plum crop in Post v. Jacobsen, 180 Cal. App. 2d 297, 4 Cal. Rptr.
817 (1960), was directly affected by three such factors-hail damage, scale
infestation, and perishability. Id. at 299-300, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19. Every
crop is subject to extremes of weather in the form of heat, cold, drought, rain,
wind-manifestations of what has been called the "capriciousness of nature."
A. BERTR-D, RURAL SOCIOLOGY 26-27 (1958).
67 For a discussion of the abuse of standardized contracts in producerprocessor dealings, see Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1161 (1949). See generally Hale,
Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); cf.
Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 CoLulvI. L. REV. 731
(1943).
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modest financial and bargaining strength to secure payment for his
products, the Director is able to reduce to some extent the problems
that producers face.
Conclusion
The Post and Almaden cases recognize the broad power that the
legislature has conferred upon the California Director of Agriculture
to deal with disputes between farmers and farm product handlers.
No case to date has set the limits of the Director's power or expressed
fear of its potential abuse. In view of the many changes in the farming industry in recent years, it seems possible that the relative bargaining
positions of farmers and handlers may no longer justify administrative
intervention on behalf of the farmer, and close legislative scrutiny of the situation is advised.
Almaden and Post indicate that the Director, in determining code
violations, has the power to interpret contracts entered into freely
by the parties. Nevertheless, the handler does not have all avenues
to court determination of the rights and duties under the contract
closed to him, since it appears that declaratory relief is available.
Moreover, the processor derives substantial protection through the
procedures providing for settlement and review by writ of mandate.
Stephen E. Engelhardt*
* Member, Second Year Class.

